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In The Supreme Court.· 
of the State of Utah 
JACKIE LEE SYDDALL, 
- vs. -
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, 
Appellant, 
-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
10950 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Jackie Lee Syddall, appeals from 
the denial of his petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant filed his petition for a writ of 
Habeas Corpus in the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County. A hear-
ing was held on March 10th, 1967, before the Honor-
able Stewart M. Hanson, Judge presiding. Appel-
lant was present in person and by counsel. Testi-
2 
mony was taken. The court at the conclusion of the. 
hearing took the matter under advisement. On April i 
13th, 1967, the court having found no evidence of 1 
any injustice to the appellant in the original pro-, 
ceeding entered an order denying the writ ol 
Habeas Corpus. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits the decision of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 25th, 1955, the appellant was 
convicted of the crimes of burglary in the second · 
degree and grand larceny. He was sentenced to the 
Utah State Prison for a term of one to twenty years 
on the burglary charge and a term of one to ten 
years on the larceny charge the sentences to run 
concurrently. 
The defendant was arrested in connection with 
a burglary of the Junior High School at Monroe, I 
Utah, on September 15th, 1955. The exact date ol 
appellant's incarceration is in dispute. However, i! 
seems clear from the record that a complaint charg 
ing him with the crimes of which he was subsequen1· 
ly convicted was issued from the Juvenile Court ol; 
the Fourth Juvenile District on October 8th, 19~5 • 
(Ex. D-1). A hearing was held in the juvenile couri 
on October 10th, 1955 (Ex. D-2). The defendant was 
advised at that time that the Juvenile Court nf thP 
Fourth Juvenile District and the District Court for 
the Sixth Judicial District had concurrent juris-
diction over him. Evidence was then taken with 
regard to the offense charged. The arresting officer, 
Rex Huntsman, gave testimony. As a result of this 
hearing, the court determined that the matter should 
be trans£ erred to the District Court for the Sixth 
Judicial District in and for the County of Sevier as 
provided by Utah Laws 1931, Ch. 29, § 27. The de-
fendant was advised that he may have a preliminary 
hearing and was advised of the nature and sub-
stance of the preliminary examination. The matter 
was ordered trans£ erred to the district court (Ex. D-2). 
On October 11th, 1955, the transcript of docket 
and all the papers in the juvenile court were trans-
mitted to the Sixth Judicial District Court (Ex. D-2}. 
Defendant was charged in the District Court of the 
Sixth Judicial District in and for Sevier County, 
by an information filed October 17th, 1955 (Ex. D-5). 
The following facts appear from the certified copies 
of the minute entries of the District Court of the Sixth 
Judicial District in and for Sevier County, State of 
Utah: On October 19th, 1955, the defendant appear-
ed before the court without counsel for arraignment. 
Sterling R. Bossard was the district attorney appear-
ing for the State of Utah. The defendant waived his 
right to have counsel appointed. The information 
was read to the defendant and he entered a plea of 
::ruilty. The court postponed pronouncement of 
Judgment until November 7th, 1955, and in the 
meantime stated it would refer the matter to the 
State Board of Adult Probation and Parole for in-
4 
vestigation. On October 24th, 1955, the de±endani, 
appeared before the court again for arraignment. 
This time, however, he was represented by his 
counsel, J. Vernon Erickson. Apparently so as no! 
to prejudice the defendant, the court allowed a 
second arraignment in this matter, and appointed J. · 
Vernon Erickson as his counsel. The matter was 
continued at the request of the defense counsel so 
that counsel could confer with the defendant. The 
defendant appeared before the court a second time 
on October 24th, 1955, represented by his court 
appointed counsel, J. Vernon Erickson, for entry ol 
a plea. The information was read to the defendarn 
and he plead not guilty. The tentative time for trial 
was fixed at November 7th, 1955, On November 7th, 
1955, the defendant appeared before the court repre-
sented by his counsel and the matter was set for 
trial beginning December 5th, 1955. On November 
8th, 1955, the defendant again appeared with court-
s.el and changed his plea from not guilty to guilty. 
The pronouncement of judgment was continued 
until November 21st, 1955. On November 25th, 1955, 
Jackie Lee Syddall was committed to the Utah Stata 
Prison by the Honorable John L. Sevy Jr., Judge ol 
the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District in and 
f~r the County of Sevier, State of Utah (Ex. D-9). 
The records further show that the warrant was 
issued October 8th, 1955, and served on October 
10th, 1955 (Ex. P-10). The appellant himself was not 
sure of exactly what day he was put in jail (R. 42), bu1 
5 
, the sheriff's records show that he was jailed October 
7th, 1955 (Ex. P-10). Respondent submits that the fore-
going statement of facts is more in keeping with the 
actual state of the records and more nearly follows 
the rule that on appeal in habeas corpus the evi-
dence will be viewed in a light most favorable to the 
respondent. Other pertinent facts will be mentioned 
in the argument portion of this brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S ARREST AND DETENTION PRIOR 
TO CONVICTION DID IN NO WAY DEPRIVE HIM OF 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS. 
Appellant apparently is arguing that his alleged 
arrest on September 15th, 1955, and subsequent de-
tention until October 8th, 1955, deprived him of 
certain rights deemed to be protected under the 
heading of due process. Respondent submits in the 
first instance that appellant was not arrested for the 
crimes charged on September 15th. In fact, the crime 
charged was committed on September 15th. How-
ever, it is clear from appellant's testimony at the 
hearing that he alleges that he was in jail prior to 
and after September 15th, 1955. Respondent sub-
mits that appellant had been in and out of the jail 
during the period in question for numerous other 
charges. On cross-examination, the plaintiff stated: 
Q. (By Mr. Gundry) I ask you if you were ar-
rested on the Fifteenth day of September, 1955, 
6 
ctnd placed in the Sevier County Jail. 
A. That is the time the warrant of arrest came 
down. I was in jail prior to the Fifteenth of Sep-
tember. 
Q. You were in jail prior to the Fifteenth of 
September, is that your testimony today under 
oath? I want you to consider your testimony 
very carefully. 
A. Yes; I was in jail before the Fifteenth day of · 
September. 
* * * * 
Q. (By Mr. Gundry) Was there any other case 
you were charged by Sheriff Huntsman with 
second degree burglary and grand larceny? 
A. You told me when you started to question 
me I was arrested on the Fifteenth. 
Q. Answer my question, was there another 
occasion when you were arrested by Sheriff 
Huntsman, any occasions? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On suspicion of those crimes? 
A. Yes. 
Then Mr. Gundry asked if Exhibit 1, which was ' 
the complaint. did evince the true date of the charge 
ag a.inst him. 
A. (By Mr. Syddall) I can't truthfully say what 
day it was, what day. 
7 
Q. The fact of the matter is, Mr. Syddall, you 
don't remember when you were put in jail, do 
you? 
A. The exact day, no, I can't remember. 
Q. Obviously you weren't in jail charged with 
this crime before the crime was committed, you 
wouldn't want this court to believe that, would 
you? 
A. I'm not sure it was the Fifteenth of Sep-
tember. 
Q. Well, how much prior to the Eighth of Oc-
tober was it when you were charged in juvenile 
court? 
A. I don't remember the exact date. 
Q. I want you to think very carefully, was it 
more than three weeks prior? 
A. Approximately three weeks. 
Q. Approximately three weeks prior. Did you 
have any trouble with the law at that time, Mr. 
Syddall? Did you get arrested for anything 
else? 
* * * * 
A. We were all picked up. There was four 
people and myself that was picked up. I wasn't 
arrested for anything. I was taken in and talked 
to on one of these nights. 
Q. But in this period of time approximately 
three weeks prior to the Eighth of October, until 
8 
the Eighth of October, in fact, until you were 
committed, you were in jail all during that time? 
A. Jail? 
Q. Were you in jail all during the time, three 
weeks prior to the Eighth of October until you 
were committed? 
A. There could have been three or four days 
between. 
* * * * 
Q. Isn't it a fact that you were arrested for 
public intoxication on the Sixth of October? 
A. I was arrested for public intoxication? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I remember that Mr. Reed Farnum, in my 
company, was arrested for public intoxication, 
yes. 
Q. That was on the Sixth of October? 
A. I don't remember. 
(R. 40, 41, 42, 43, 53, 54, 55). 
From the foregoing it is clear that in the appel-
lant's mind the exact date on which he was arrested 
is definitely in doubt. However, the arresting officer, 
Sheriff Huntsman, was examined by appellant's 
counsel, Mr. Robert B. Hansen, at the hearing. 
Sheriff Huntsman testified as follows: 
Q. (By Mr. Hansen) Now, can you tell us, 
Sheriff, what day Mr. Syddall was first brought 
to the Richfield Jail as a result of this matter m 
1955? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And can you tell us what day that was? 
A. We keep a record, a master file, of when 
they are jailed and what happens here. Now, 
do you want me to read this? 
Q. Would you, please? 
A. It says: "Jackie Lee Syddall jailed 10-7-55: 
warrant issued October 8; warrant served Oc-
tober 10." 
Thus, petitioner's contention that he was de-
tained from September 15th, through October 8th, 
the time of which the warrant issued, is conclusively 
rebutted by the record. However, assuming that 
such detention was unwarranted or illegal, the de-
tention is not prejudicial if subsequent proceedings 
are adequate to protect the right of the accused. 
Osbourne v. Harris, 115 Utah 204, 203 P.2d 917 (1949). 
An illegal detention of a defendant is prejudicial 
only if the detention in some way influences the 
plea. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 {1948); Trow-
bridge v. Pennsylvania, 112 F. Supp. 356 (1952), af-
firmed, 204 F.2d 689 (1953); Commonwealth v. Keen-
an, 170 Pa. Super 282, 85 A.2d 678 (1952); Zell v. 
Warden. Md. House of Corrections. 191 Md. 7 45, 59 
A.2d 737 (1948). 
In the instant case, it is clear that no prejudice 
would have resulted even if appellant was detained 
10 
cts he alleges. Subsequent to his alleged confine-
ment, appellant had counsel present, entered a ple,-1 
of not guilty, and then with counsel, changed hi; 
plea to guilty. Therefore, any prejudice resulting 
from the alleged illegal detention prior to the charge 
is wholly vitiated. 
POINT II 
THE RECORD ON APPEAL IS SUFFICIENT TO 
ADEQUATELY DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS IN QUESTION. 
Appellant's second argument is extremely 
vague. However, it seems that he is attempting to 
complain about the loss of certain records. Respond-
ent submits that the record before this court clearly 
shows the proceedings in the juvenile court, the 
subsequent transfer to the district court, and the ul-
timate conviction on a plea of guilty taken in the dis-
trict court. 
Appellant frivolously asks this court to assume 
that "lost records" would show certain facts which 
prejudiced him. He makes no allegation of preju-
dice. He merely asserts the bare speculation that 
somewhere there may be evidence of prejudicial 
treatment. This he asks the court to assume in the 
face of the statement on page 13 of his brief that 
"The only evidence, if any, ever introduced in any 
court was the testimony of Rex Huntsman, Sheriff, 
taken on the Tenth day of October in the juvenile 
court." 
The appellant did not complain of any "losi 
records" in his petition for the writ of Habeas 
11 
Corpus. Nor is there any evidence in the transcript 
of the proceedings at the hearing to indicate that 
the appellant was asserting the alleged loss of rec-
ords as a ground for his release on Habeas Corpus. 
The law is well settled that grounds for Habeas Corp-
us cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal. 
Washington v. Turner, 17 Utah2d 361, 412 P.2d 449 
(1966). Thus, it is clear that appellant's second argu-
ment has no merit for both of the foregoing reasons. 
POINT III 
THE RECORD CLEARLY SHOWS THAT APPEL-
LANT WAS NOT DENIED LEGAL COUNSEL AT THE 
TIME OF ENTERING HIS PLEA OF GUILTY; AND 
FURTHER, THAT APPELLANT WAS ADEQUATELY 
ADVISED BY COUNSEL AT ALL CRITICAL POINTS 
IN THE PROCEEDINGS. 
Appellant is apparently making the argument 
that he did not have the advice of counsel durinq 
the period between October 8th, and the date 
on which he was sentenced to the Utah State 
Prison. In the light of the record and the minute en-
tries that are exhibits herein, it is clear that appellant 
was, in fact, represented by J. Vernon Erickson. 
After the transfer of appellant's case from the juve-
nile court to the district court, he was arraigned with-
out counsel. Subsequently, either his mother or the 
court or someone got in touch with Mr. Erickson, 
and the court appointed Mr. Erickson as counsel for 
the defendant on October 24th, 1955. Prior to Octo-
ber 24th, the appellant had apparently been stand-
inq on his plea of quilty. Subsequent to October 
12 
24th, the plea was changed, apparently on the ad-
vice of counsel, from guilty to not guilty. The case ' 
was continued to allow time for counsel to consult 
with the defendant. Then on November 8th, the de-
fendant again appeared with counsel and changed 
his plea from not guilty to guilty. 
In the light of these facts, clearly established by 
the record, it is difficult for respondent to see how 
appellant can allege that he was without counsel. , 
That counsel was provided is beyond dispute. 
Appellant also apparently would make the 
argument that he suffered detriment from the fact 
that he waived preliminary hearing without the 
benefit of counsel. Respondent submits that this 
argument has no merit. In McGuffey v. Turner, 18 
Utah 2d 354, 356, 423 P.2d. 166, 167 (1967), the court 
stated: 
It is rather difficult to see how a guilty de-
fendant is prejudiced by waiving a preliminary 
hearing when all that is entailed at the hearing is 
that sufficient evidence be given to the committing 
magistrate to cause him to believe that a crime has 
been committed and that there is probable cause 
to believe the defendant guilty thereof. 
In light of petitioner's subsequent plea of guilty, 
it is difficult to conceive how he could have been 
harmed by a waiver of preliminary hearing. 
Respondent submits that the fact that he did not 
have counsel at the time of waiving the preliminary 
hearing did in no way prejudice him or infringe 
upon any of his rights. State v. Seymour. 18 Utah 
13 
2d 153, 417 P.2d 655 (1966). In the Seymour case, it 
was stated, 18 Utah 2d. at 156, 417 P.2d. at 657: 
The processes of law have only one legitimate 
objective: To seek out truth and do justice. It does 
not serve this objective nor does it comport with 
our sense of justice, to regard the proceeding as a 
game of tricks in which the defendant goes free 
merely because there is some error or deficiency 
which reason dictat.es would have no materi81 bear-
ing upon the fairness of the proceedings or its out-
come. [Emphasis added.] 
Respondent submits that in this case appellant 
has been accorded every fairness, every opportun-
ity, and every consideration by the court, by the 
prosecutor, by his counsel, and everyone concern-
ed with the matter from the initial stages. The record 
shows that the individual here in question has had 
numerous difficulties in adjusting to society. He was 
in the State Industrial School at eleven (R. 76); he 
was back in the Industrial School on numerous oc-
casions since that time (R. 37); he admitted that he 
was probably on parole from the Industrial School 
at the time he was arrested for the offense charged 
(R. 42, 43); he has been convicted of at least one 
felony since the conviction we are concerned with 
here (Ex. D-11). 
With this record, the petitioner comes crying 
into this court that he was a seventeen-year-old 
youth and his rights were not protected. The evi-
dence shows just the opposite: that he was given 
every consideration; that he has been a problem 
child since the age of eleven; that he has been un-
14 
able to adjust to society; and that there is great 
doubt as to the veracity of any of the statements he 
has made both in his petition and his brief filed in 
this court. The State of Utah also has an interest in 
the fair dealing and fair play in this matter. McGuf. 
fey v. Tumer, 18 Utah 2d 354, 423 P.2d 166 (1967); 
State v. Seymour, 18 Utah 2d 153, 417 P.2d 655 (1966). 
Gallegos v. Tumer, 17 Utah 2d 273, 409 P.2d 386 
(1965); Ward v. Tumer, 12 Utah 2d 310, 366 P.2d 72 
(1961) (concurring opinion). 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that all appellant's con-
tentions are without merit. In fact, his allegations are 
so frivolous that they hardly warrant consideration. 
It is the opinion of respondent that this attempt to 
gain freedom by an application for a writ of habeas 
corpus is a clear abuse of that important and funda-
mental protection in our system of justice. 
In view of this record, wholly void of any sem-
blance of support for petitioner's unwarranted and 
unfounded allegations, the respondent can oniy 
urge and trust that this court will affirm the decision 
of the trial court. 
ResPectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City. Utah 
